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The Rise and Fall of the Icelandic Economy
David Howden∗ 
St. Louis University – Madrid Campus 
Iceland became the first developed country in 30 years to 
request help from the IMF in 2009. While the depths of its recent 
recession are well studied, the causes of its origin are still 
misunderstood. This paper looks at two factors: (1) the blanket 
guarantees provided to the Icelandic banking system by various 
public agencies, and which fostered an environment of excessive risk 
taking; (2) a faulty inflation-targeting framework by the Central 
Bank of Iceland, which resulted in a credit binge engulfing the small 
island. While the first factor explains why Iceland´s banking sector 
grew as large as it did, the second accounts for the magnitude of the 
imbalances in both the real and financial sectors.1 
Key Words: Iceland; Economic crisis; Inflation targeting; Credit; 
Deposit insurance. 
Despite Iceland’s being one of the oldest democracies in the 
world, its monetary regime has a much shorter history. The small 
island nation gained monetary autonomy from Denmark only in 1918, 
and didn’t start minting its own coinage until four years later.  The 
Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) is one of the world’s youngest central 
banks, serving in its capacity since only 1961. Bouts of hyperinflation 
ended in 1981 with a revaluation of the Icelandic króna and a shift 
towards monetary stability. This shift was completed in 2001 as the 
CBI ended the fixed exchange-rate regime, which had defined the 
króna for decades, while also moving to an inflation-targeting 
framework to achieve price stability. 
In 2008, the most severe recession to affect a Western country 
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enveloped Iceland. The country became the first developed economy 
in over 30 years to request aid from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The CBI had evidently failed to provide monetary stability less 
than a decade after the floatation of the króna brought on lofty calls 
for it. 
Consider the following stylized facts. Between 2001 and 2008, the 
island’s population increased by only 1.66 percent per year, while its 
narrow money supply (M1) increased by almost 34 percent. Consumer 
price inflation averaged more than 6.6 percent annually over this 
period. While the stock market boomed, increasing its market 
capitalization by over 12 percent per year,  the average citizen saw his 
real (inflation-adjusted) share of the wealth increase by less than 2 
percent per year. 
Somehow there was a disconnect between the impressive growth 
on the money-side of the economy and the lackluster performance of 
the real-side. In this paper I look at two sources of imbalance.  
On the one hand, there was a wide range of investment 
guarantees motivating the increase in risk-taking of both Icelandic 
and international investors. These included, primarily though not 
exclusively, (1) a broad and comprehensive deposit insurance plan 
offered by the country’s financial supervisor, the FME 
(“Fjármálaeftirliti “ or “Financial Supervisory Authority”); (2) 
mortgage insurance offered through the Icelandic government’s 
Housing Financing Fund (HFF), (3) explicit lender of last resort 
guarantees by the CBI; and (4) implicit guarantees to the Icelandic 
State through supranational organizations such as the IMF. These 
guarantees motivated Icelanders to increase their risk-taking more 
than would otherwise be sustainable, and also increased the amount 
of foreign funds entering the country as international investors moved 
to exploit Icelandic profit opportunities in the mid-2000s. 
On the other hand, there was a faulty inflation-targeting 
framework by the CBI. The key rationale behind such a framework is 
that price stability will promote broader economic stability. As we 
shall see, not only did the CBI regularly overshoot its inflation target, 
but economic stability would not have been the result even if it had 
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been met.  The manipulations to the interest rate at the hands of the 
central bank caused investors to change their consumption-
investment patterns, with the result being an unsustainable boom 
waiting for its luck to turn. 
Investment Guarantees – Narrow and Broad 
Housing Financing Fund 
Iceland’s government-owned mortgage lender, the Housing 
Financing Fund (HFF), was created in 1999 by the Housing Act (no. 
44/1998). Its stated goal is to “ensure housing security and equality for 
all Icelanders through lending and organization of housing affairs … 
to increase people’s opportunities of obtaining and leasing housing on 
controllable terms.”   
The HFF quickly extended its operations to a large segment of 
the population. By 2004, almost 90 percent of Icelandic households 
held an HFF loan, which the Fund financed by issuing debt; almost 
half of the Icelandic bond market was invested in HFF-issued bonds 
(Hunt, Tchaidze and Westin 2005: 29). The size of the debt market 
guaranteed by the HFF, and in turn the government, had quickly 
grown too large for the state to guarantee if wide-ranging defaults 
occurred, as would almost certainly happen if housing prices declined 
in the highly leveraged market. By striving for housing security for all, 
the HFF imperiled the solvency of the Icelandic state through the 
reliance on increasing housing prices it engendered throughout the 
housing boom.   
The HFF is not unique among developed countries. Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac also existed to promote housing opportunities in the 
United States. What set the HFF’s operations apart from other 
similar institutions was the scope of its involvement and the range of 
individuals granted access to its services. While many housing funds 
existed to aid individuals in the lower-income strata gain access to the 
housing markets, Iceland extended these opportunities to all. (Bagus 
and Howden (2011: 56) note that this could be a result of a conscious 
effort to promote egalitarianism among Icelanders.)  
Most state housing agencies in other countries aided home 
ownership only indirectly. The HFF, in contrast, was not just limited 
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to underwriting private loans but also issued loans directly to 
consumers. Icelanders showed widespread public support for the 
state-controlled mortgage system. Furthermore, the HFF was 
explicitly guaranteed by the Icelandic government, leaving no 
ambiguities as to the solvency of the Fund. HFF-guaranteed 
mortgages could be issued at essentially the same risk as the Icelandic 
government because the latter served as a guarantor of the former. 
This support encouraged the HFF to expand its operations beyond its 
already lenient core operating mandate. By 2005 the Fund was 
funneling excess liquidity into the commercial banking system. 
Approximately 80 billion krónur (1 billion euros) were made available 
to Icelandic businesses.  This was an activity not covered in HFF’s 
original mission (Íslandsbanki 2005). 
The imbalances bred through the HFF were noted during the 
housing boom, though often as a side comment about the efficiencies 
brought by the Fund. Hunt, Tchaidze and Westin (2005: 31), for 
example, commented that efficiencies in the mortgage market by the 
HFF had brought positive effects to mortgage interest rate 
reductions. Icelandic mortgage lending had increased by 63 percent 
during 2004, and long-term mortgage interest rates fell by 5.10 
percent in nominal terms and 4.15 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. 
This decline in mortgage rates was not due to any positive effects of 
lending competition, but rather to an accommodative monetary policy 
by the CBI coupled with risk-reduction via HFF-guaranteed 
mortgages.2  
Although the HFF was the major player in the early stages of 
Iceland’s housing boom, private banks soon followed. Flush with cash, 
they aggressively sought to meet the HFF’s terms in order to secure 
                                 
2 Repeated calls from the IMF to reform the HFF were regularly ignored. In 
2005 the IMF recommended that the HFF alter the scope of its operations to align 
it with those of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; i.e., take a secondary or indirect 
role in the mortgage market. It should be noted that even this advice would not 
have shielded the Icelandic economy from the pernicious effects of a state-
guaranteed agency. After all, mortgage securitization by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are both commonly cited roots of America’s own crisis.  
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their main source of banking profitability (Bagus and Howden 2011: 
58). Banks increased mortgage maturities to 40 years from the then-
conventional 25. Króna loan limits were increased to allow for more 
high-end houses to be purchased. The maximum loan-to-value ratio 
was increased to 80 percent (versus the HFF’s maximum having 
ranged from 65-70 percent throughout the 2000s).  
Bank lending was not limited to construction and housing loans, 
as was the case with the HFF. Equity withdrawals and mortgage 
refinancing became the norm. This expansion in lending opportunities 
by the private banking system spurred on additional competition from 
the HFF in a bid to remain relevant. The competitive back and forth 
between banks and the HFF was apparent as early as 2004 
(Thovarldsson 2009: 150).  
The HFF reduced long-term mortgage rates further to 4.15 
percent, still protected by the credit guarantee of the Icelandic 
government. While banks could not compete with the Fund in terms 
of mortgage pricing, they could in risk-taking via the terms of their 
loans. Loan-to-value ratios were increased to 100 percent, allowing 
homeowners to finance the whole cost of their housing purchases. It 
was soon clear that banks, despite competing in different areas of 
business than the HFF (i.e., in the broad terms of the loan instead of 
just the interest rate), would be unable to sustain themselves in the 
long run against the state-guaranteed entity. 
Being at a disadvantage concerning the interest rates they could 
offer to customers, banks competed on different types of credit 
services. These new services turned out to be destabilizing not just to 
the individual banks but to the broader economy. The quality of 
acceptable collateral for mortgages continually fell, causing a general 
under-pricing of risk in the private mortgage market (Tchaidze, 
Annett and Ong 2007: 24).  By 2006, over 16 percent of new 
mortgages had loan-to-value ratios above 90 percent (Honjo and 
Mitra 2006), and 40-year mortgages became increasingly the norm. 
The increased duration coupled with decreased collateral quality 
exposed banks to large losses if interest rates rose. Tchaidze, Annett 
and Ong (2007: 24-25) estimated that a 2 percentage point increase in 
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rates would cause almost a half billion dollars in losses to the banking 
sector.  
The result of this sustained competition between the public and 
private lenders, combined with artificially imposed state guarantees, 
was a demand surge for housing. Prices steadily increased, with 
housing price growth remaining above income growth until the 
recession was well underway in 2009. Since income growth was not 
responsible for the increase in housing prices, an increased 
dependence on credit facilitated the housing boom (Howden 2013b).  
Investment Guarantees, Narrow and Broad 
Just as the HFF reduced risk on real-estate investments, there 
was another series of additional guarantees on wider-ranging financial 
transactions. These guarantees can be defined as narrow, in the sense 
that they only applied to one financial product, or broad in the sense 
that general support was given to all financial products. 
Deposit insurance, for example, solves the immediate problem 
that the bank run poses while exacerbating the larger issue of moral 
hazard (Bhattacharya et al. 1998; Thies and Gerlowski 1989). By 
removing the threat of losses, deposit insurance also removes the 
monitoring role that depositors serve with respect to their banks. 
Instead of seeking the most prudently managed banks, depositors 
shift their funds to those banks offering them the lowest expenses or 
highest returns. These criteria, incidentally, also generally indicate 
that the bank is pursuing riskier activities than its competitors. 3  
While central banks and deposit insurance agencies can mitigate 
this problem by actively monitoring banks, most deposit insurance 
plans also include provisions to entice depositors to aid them with this 
                                 
3 Uninsured depositors are much more likely to withdraw their deposits from 
a bank when they perceive it to be financial unstable (Iyer et al. 2013). Uninsured 
depositors, along with bank employees, are thus one of the key forces imposing 
market discipline on banks as their deposit redemptions signal to banks that 
lending practices are not sufficiently prudent to maintain a stable level of core 
funding. In addition to concern about unsafe lending practices, uninsured 
depositors may also withdraw funds as they grow weary of abrupt management 
changes or in response to deterioration in general economic conditions. 
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task.  
A maximum insurable amount on deposits is generally defined, 
creating the incentive for depositors above this threshold to actively 
monitor their bank. Foreign-denominated deposits are usually not 
covered, partly to create another group of depositors to monitor 
banking activities, and partly to eliminate exchange-rate risk from the 
insurer. Icelandic deposit insurance ventured from these guidelines in 
important ways. 
In 1998 the Icelandic government made a number of changes to 
the organizational and regulatory structure of the country’s financial 
industry that proved destabilizing (Mayes 2009). The CBI was given 
one role in its new inflation-targeting mandate, while the financial 
supervisory role was removed and amalgamated with the deposit 
insurance provider under a new financial supervisory authority, the 
FME. Central banks typically take on a regulatory role to better align 
the risks of excess credit creation with the constraint of capital 
requirements. The complete removal of any regulatory role from the 
CBI removed an important policy tool which hindered its ability to 
actively monitor the extent to which credit creation was destabilizing 
the growing banking system. 
The instability came in the form of having a central bank in 
charge of the country’s credit conditions without also having some 
role in monitoring banking stability. In standard literature on the 
microeconomics of banking, the agency that eliminates a banking 
panic must also fill the regulatory void caused by a lack of client 
monitoring (Gorton and Huang 2003). The historical evolution of 
central banks saw them take on their regulatory roles as they assumed 
the role of lender of last resort to replace depositors as monitors 
(Bagus and Howden 2012: 167).  
Article 7 of the “Act on the Central Bank of Iceland” of 2001 
announced for the first time an explicit lender of last resort role (CBI 
2001: 33; see also Bagus and Howden 2011: 95). This contrasts with 
most developed countries, such as the United States, which assume 
this role only implicitly. Despite improving its transparency since 
2000, the CBI still ranked far below its European counterparts in this 
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respect (Dincer and Eichengreen 2009). With only partial knowledge 
of the lending practices of the CBI, the FME was ill-equipped to 
properly oversee the private banking system the CBI funded.  
Adding to this problem and further skewing the CBI’s incentives 
was the fact that it was highly politically motivated (Bergmann 
forthcoming). A history of state intervention in the economy bred an 
unprecedented bond between politics and business (Jonsson 2009), 
and in few places was this as engrained as the CBI. Political 
connections at all levels in the financial sector made effective 
oversight and regulation almost impossible (Sibert 2009). David 
Oddsson was prime minister for 13 years before taking on his new 
role as governor of the CBI in 2005, and carried his own political 
baggage with him. Indeed, it was difficult to discern who was 
captured, the banks or the government regulators. While prominent 
politicians, such as Oddsson, moved into the financial sector, the 
financial sector returned the favor – they were regularly the largest 
donors to political parties (Vaiman et al. 2010: 267).  
Most deposit insurance plans purposely exclude foreign-
denominated deposits from coverage. By insuring deposits 
denominated exclusively in domestic currency, the insurance fund can 
more easily manage its potential payouts. By extending insurance to 
foreign-denominated accounts, Iceland created  an ambiguity as to 
who was liable for Icelandic banks operating in foreign countries. For 
example, one of Iceland´s largest banks, Landsbanki, opened an 
online retail bank in the United Kingdom, Icesave. British regulators 
were uninterested in monitoring the bank´s operations, as it was 
presumed to be accountable to the Icelandic authorities. Icelandic 
authorities had relatively little knowledge of the subsidiaries’ 
operations, as they were located in a foreign country. This foreign 
coverage proved to be one of the causes of undoing for Iceland´s 
deposit fund during its crisis, as it lacked sufficient foreign currency 
reserves to honor the accounts (Bagus and Howden 2011: chap. 4). 
Furthermore, in order to leave a set of depositors interested in 
monitoring their bank´s operations, most deposit insurance plans 
mandate a maximum limit on the insurable deposits. Deposits held 
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above the limit are subject to losses, and thus motivate the depositor 
to be selective as to which bank he entrusts his funds.  There was no 
maximum limit in the Icelandic plan. Not only did this remove an 
important set of monitors from the banking sector, but it also exposed 
the Fund to potentially unlimited losses in the event of a bank failure.  
The Icelandic deposit insurance plan was thus a narrow guarantee 
on deposit-taking institutions. As a consequence of this risk reduction, 
investors, both domestic (and later on foreign), continued channeling 
money to these banks to earn higher risk-adjusted returns. 
Actual risk in the banking system, as investors eventually found 
out, was higher than originally perceived and depended on the 
solvency of the Icelandic government (the Althingi). As the state acted 
as the ultimate back-stop of the financial system, and guarantee would 
only be as good as the government making it. Luckily for the Althingi, 
additional support was forthcoming from the International Monetary 
Fund. 
In the wake of the Russian, Asian and Latin American currency 
crises of the late 1990s, IMF Counsellor Jack Boorman (2000: 366) 
noted that “If the crisis has taught us anything, it should be a 
reminder of the key importance of the institutional infrastructure 
needed to manage a successful market capitalist economy — legal 
systems, bankruptcy procedures, standards, transparency — many of 
the things now captured under the heading of architecture.” The IMF 
was to be a key component of this “institutional architecture.” 
On a visit to the Central Bank of Iceland, Anne Krueger, then-
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, reiterated these sentiments 
and assured leaders of developed and developing economies alike 
that the Fund was prepared to assist where necessary: “Crises have 
always been part of the Fund's work. The challenge for the IMF is to 
do as much as possible to prevent them, but, once crises occur, to 
resolve them as smoothly as possible” (Krueger 2004). 
As the IMF increased its role in assisting sovereigns during times 
of crisis, it decreased the risk premium placed on cross-border 
investments. Foreigners previously weary of investing in countries 
with high or unstable inflation, such as Iceland, were enticed to enter 
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new and exotic markets where they had the chance for above-average 
profits with little risk in light of the IMF’s guarantees standing behind 
the country’s sovereign.  
Iceland Bank Operations 
The CBI adopted an inflation-targeting program on 27 March 
2001. This target rate was continually exceeded, and sowed the seeds 
of its own demise by fostering greater amounts of credit expansion 
than would otherwise be possible.  
The inflation-targeting framework was borrowed from other 
countries and calibrated in ways that were not relevant to the new 
flexible exchange-rate króna (Hunt et al. 2005: 11; Bagus and 
Howden 2011: 16-18). The policy model itself was borrowed from the 
Bank of Canada, and then fine-tuned for the minor differences 
between the two countries (Pétursson 2002). The differences 
ultimately proved to be not so minor. Canada’s model estimated the 
target interest rate with the United States as the relevant foreign 
sector. The CBI recalibrated this to make use of the United Kingdom, 
yet each country’s relationship with the other is markedly different. 
Canada enjoys a much higher degree of trade with the U.S. than 
Iceland does with the U.K. Canadian capital flows are primarily into 
or out of the U.S, while Iceland is linked extensively with Scandinavia. 
Canada’s interest rates largely mirror those in the U.S., and its output 
relies on many of the same inputs. By comparison, besides both being 
the belligerents in the Cod Wars of the 1950s and 1970s, Iceland and 
the United Kingdom share very few economic similarities.  
The CBI knew that its inflation-targeting framework was a failure 
and that the target was regularly overshot (Central Bank of Iceland 
2007: Box I-2).4 The source of this problem may have been that the 
inflation target used a much wider range than most countries (four 
times as wide as the Bank of Canada’s initial specification). This shift 
was made to allow for volatile inflation to not unduly influence policy 
decisions, though it resulted in a lenient approach to controlling 
                                 
4 The IMF also noted these problems during Iceland’s boom, though calls for 
reform went mostly unnoticed (Honjo and Hunt 2006; Honjo and Mitra 2006).  
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inflation. It also excluded many prices from its calculation, some of 
which were prices on imported goods and essential for a realistic 
modeling of inflation (Hunt et al. 2005).  
As the CBI regularly overshot its inflation target, real borrowing 
rates plunged and remained around zero for the entirety of the 2000s 
(table 4). 
With little adherence to an inflation target, the CBI commenced 
a period of rapid credit expansion. While inflation remained high, a 
decline in real borrowing costs occurred because of three factors, only 
one of which was under the direct control of the CBI. 
First was an extremely accommodative monetary policy. Narrow 
measures of Iceland´s money supply, such as M1, grew at a feverish 
pitch of at least 22 percent annually from 2002-08 (table 5). Total M1 
outstanding grew by over 650 percent from 2000-08. It had taken the 
economy the previous 14 years to achieve this growth in percentage 
terms, and the creation of money during the 2000s was greater than 
the country had ever witnessed in its history. Indeed, many 
economists were taken by surprise when the CBI reduced the reserve 
requirement in 2003, and furthermore when it eliminated this 
requirement for deposits of foreign subsidiaries in spring 2008 
(Matthiasson 2008: 15).  
Second was through the private fractional-reserve banking 
system. Coupled with lax regulatory monitoring by the central bank 
and government, the comprehensive deposit insurance plan removed 
the last bastion of monitors of bank lending practices: depositors. As 
a result, Icelandic banks were free to engage in what otherwise might 
have been seen and discouraged for what it was – extreme risk-taking 
with funds entrusted to them for safekeeping purposes.  
Indeed, banks turned from holding debt instruments as assets to 
taking equity positions in domestic and foreign companies in a bid to 
bolster profits (Howden 2013a). By 2004-05, bank investments in 
other firms expanded by 57.5 percent and 24.7 percent (Report of the 
Special Investigation Commission 2010: chap. 21). This strategy 
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allowed banks significant returns on their equity investments from 
2000-07, with all of the big three Icelandic banks earning more than 
24 percent on their equity investments during 2006 and 2007 (Portes 
and Baldursson 2007).  As banks came to rely increasingly on equity 
returns for their growth, the importance of continued expansion 
through investments in other businesses grew. This growth was 
primarily promoted by decreasing the quality of investments made 
(Flannery 2009: Annex 3). By 2006, 80 percent of Iceland bank profits 
were earned on capital gains and non-interest income in distinction to 
the more usual interest incomes (figure 1, compare with Tchaidze et 
al. 2007: 22). 
As a consequence of this asset appreciation, banks begin to issue 
more liabilities without endangering their regulatory capital or 
liquidity requirements. The IMF soon characterized Icelandic deposit 
banks as more closely resembling investment banks as a result of this 
reliance on equities. Regulators were not alarmed by such a 
development because the buoyant stock market kept Icelandic banks 
well-capitalized. Indeed, from 2000-07, Icelandic banks held more 
capital relative to their asset base than their European counterparts, 
and were comparable to those in the American system (figure 2).5 
Finally, by 2005, Icelandic banks had more-or-less exhausted the 
opportunities for organic growth from the domestic market (Portes 
and Baldursson 2007: 36-38; Jónsson 2009: 107-112). In a bid to 
maintain high growth rates and profit margins, they began seeking 
foreign capital.  
High domestic króna interest rates spurred by high levels of 
inflation pushed banks to foreign markets to access lower-cost 
funding. Online retail branches were set up in several European 
countries (primarily the U.K. and Netherlands) to attract foreign 
depositors.  These foreign retail deposits offered accounts in the local 
currency, but at higher interest rates more reflective of the Icelandic 
                                 
5 The gap in the Icelandic data in 2008 represents the bankruptcy of the 
financial system. It was only with the writing off of large amounts of bad assets, 
and the shedding of liabilities, that the banking system could return to solvency 
from 2009 onward. 
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market. The banks would convert the foreign deposits to króna and 
invest them domestically in the Icelandic market. Thus the banks were 
able to pay foreign depositors higher króna interest rates on their 
foreign-currency deposits.  
As the incoming foreign funds were converted to króna, the now 
well-known carry trade (borrowing at low foreign interest rates to 
invest in higher yielding Icelandic investments) became prevalent. 
This fresh demand for króna kept the currency strong, and removed 
the threat that the exchange-rate risk that the foreign-denominated 
accounts provided would threaten the solvency of the Icelandic banks 
(Report of the Special Investigation Commission 2010: chap. 21: 30).  
More risk-averse foreign investors could invest directly in the 
Icelandic market through “Glacier Bonds”. The króna-denominated 
bonds were marketed directly to foreigners to further attract foreign 
capital. These bonds allowed for higher interest rates because they 
did not involve the cost to the issuer of exchanging the foreign 
currency into króna, but they also exposed the borrower to additional 
exchange-rate risk. First issued in August 2005, by 2007 more than 
$6.3 billion of these bonds were outstanding, equivalent to almost 40 
percent of the country´s GDP (Bagus and Howden 2011: 63).  
Coupled with the guarantees provided through the deposit 
insurance fund and, more broadly, the IMF, Icelandic banks rapidly 
escalated their foreign-currency exposure. While this approach 
provided cheap funding during the boom, when the króna started 
depreciating in 2008 it set in motion a series of króna-denominated 
asset sales by banks that spiraled into a depreciating spiral. The CBI 
lacked sufficient foreign-exchange reserves to meet foreign 
withdrawals. By 2007 the banking sector held only 1/14 the amount 
necessary as central bank foreign exchange reserves to cover the 
banks’ foreign short-term liabilities (Gylfason 2008). In this way a run 
on foreign branches of Icelandic banks put in motion a currency crisis 
that endangered the domestic banking system’s solvency.  
The use of foreign funding had allowed a rapid expansion of 
Icelandic banks. By 2007 deposit bank assets were 275 percent the 
size of the small country´s whole GDP. (In contrast, the United 
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States never saw its banks´ total asset holdings grow to more than 71 
percent of its GDP.) In 2006 alone, Icelandic bank assets grew 72 
percentage points quicker than GDP. 
The final result of these three factors – an accommodative central 
bank policy, an influx of foreign funds and a reliance of equity 
investments that maintained the illusion of healthy liquidity and 
capital ratios – was a spurt of credit expansion rarely seen.  
The amount of bank-created credit relative to the deposit base 
remained above 200 percent for the whole boom of the 2000s in 
Iceland. By comparison, the same figure in the United States never 
rose above 84 percent, and averaged around 80 percent. (In 2005, 
Icelandic banks issued more than four times the amount of credit 
against their deposits as their U.S. counterparts.) While the dot.com 
bust in the early 2000s saw the United States´ broad money supply 
diminish relative to its deposits, in Iceland credit continued growing 
and almost doubled in 2007 alone. Icelandic credit creation was able 
to surpass even that of an American economy that itself seemed 
awash in liquidity. 
Furthermore, a two-fold danger resulted from the broad implicit 
and explicit commitments of support. First is that as the risk of a 
sovereign default is reduced through IMF intervention, investors will 
support higher levels of debt at lower interest rates in these countries. 
Indeed, after debt remained steady throughout most of the 1990s, the 
new millennium ushered in a period of escalating and rapidly 
increasing debt issuances in the Icelandic economy after Krueger´s 
reassuring speech at the CBI. 
More dangerous, perhaps, was that as a country´s long-term 
stability was promoted artificially through the IMF, the volatility of its 
exchange rate decreased. If this were attributable to a fundamental 
improvement in the country´s financial position, the risk reduction 
would be welcome. Unfortunately, in Iceland´s case there was no 
improvement in the underlying fundamentals and the decreased 
volatility increased the inflow of foreign investment contingent on the 
IMF coming to the country´s aid if misfortune struck.  
 David Howden 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 
410 
What Instigated Iceland’s Bust? 
Iceland’s collapse in 2008 has been attributed to various causes, 
including: (1) an unstable and oversized banking industry (Buiter and 
Sibert 2008), (2) a central bank ill-suited to serve as a lender of last 
resort (ibid.), (3) collateral damage of the global liquidity crisis made 
apparent by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Fri riksson 2009: 
11), (4) free-market capitalism making bad bets with other people’s 
money (Gumbel 2008), or (5) from a corrupt corporate culture 
making politically motivated instead of financially prudent 
investments (Vaiman et al 2010). While these are all appealing 
explanations, they mainly answer the question of “what went wrong in 
2008?” rather than the more relevant question “what caused the 
events of 2008?”  
I have thus far illustrated that the growth in the amount of credit 
was the result of three factors – wide-ranging investment guarantees, 
a loose monetary policy by the CBI, and an influx of foreign funding 
into the private banking sector. These factors created a private 
banking sector too large for the central bank to support, but they also 
created an unstable situation even if the global liquidity crunch failed 
to materialize.  
Iceland’s boom can best be defined as an unsustainable credit 
expansion along the lines of an Austrian business cycle (ABC) (i.e. a 
business cycle as described by the Austrian School of Economics). 
This type of business cycle occurs when a central bank artificially sets 
its policy rate below a sustainable level. Alternatively, institutions can 
reduce the perceived risk on investments, and thus exogenously push 
risk-adjusted rates below those that would otherwise obtain (Cowen 
1997).  
The results of an ABC are three-fold, with a common theme 
being economic unsustainability prone to increasing imbalances until 
finally succumbing to a rebalancing recession. This recession is 
important, becauseit allows investment and consumption preferences 
to realign in sustainable ways with resource and savings constraints. 
Overconsumption occurs as consumers take advantage of low 
interest rates to increase their borrowing (Mises 1949: Garrison 
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2004). They are also demotivated from saving through either high 
inflation rates or low real returns. Malinvestment occurs whereby 
investment expenditure is skewed to longer-dated projects that will 
not yield a return until a further date in the future (Hayek 1935; 
Mises 1949; Garrison 2001, 2004). This shift should not to be 
confused with overinvestment (Salerno 2012). It is not a matter of too 
much investment taking place but rather that low interest rates 
motivate investment projects of longer duration such that the fruits of 
their labors will not materialize until a much later date. (e.g., research 
and development expenditures can take decades to create profits, 
while infrastructure expenditure such as highways can show their 
worth quickly.) Furthermore, not all long-dated investment projects 
are unsustainable. The key is to match the expected duration of the 
project with the availability of funding by savers (Bagus and Howden 
2010). Any force which artificially lowers interest rates, such as loose 
central bank monetary policy, will have the effect of enticing 
investments to be undertaken not matched by a desire by consumers 
to save for an extended period. Lower interest rates push 
entrepreneurs to pursue longer-dated projects as their net present 
values increase relative to those on shorter-dated projects. Finally, as 
the financial sector is the initial beneficiary of any newly created 
credit, it will grow in size and importance relative to the real 
production-oriented sector (Howden 2010). The Icelandic economy 
from 2000-08 illustrates each of these effects.  
As in the United States, the primary increase in private 
consumption was in real estate. This was facilitated by the HFF, as 
outlined above, though the HFF could only work within the confines 
of the base interest rate set by the CBI. While housing consumption 
increased dramatically as Icelanders went from a country of renters to 
home owners, the boom brought ostentatious displays of 
wealth.(Bagus and Howden 2011: 68-71). 
Vacations to St. Tropez or Dubai became almost the norm. 
Elaborate birthday parties served expensive imported wines in place 
of the more traditional Icelandic schnapps, brennivín. Social troubles 
brewed as the older generation, accustomed to Spartan lives and 
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thrift, was exposed to the younger nouveau riche:  
The older generation shook their heads as their children purchased 
jacuzzis, trampolines, and chocolate fountains. The sale of 
champagne increased 82%. The luxury electronics maker Bang and 
Olufsen sold more in its store in Reykjavik than in any other store 
worldwide except for Moscow. And amazingly, more Range Rovers 
were sold in Iceland in 2006 than collectively in the other Nordic 
countries combined! By the age of fifteen, I had been on a holiday 
abroad just once. . . . Now the typical family was going abroad once 
or even twice a year. Armani was doing such business in Iceland that 
they sent a tailor from Italy to make suits to measure. (Thorvaldsson 
2009: 156) 
While consumption expenditures increased, they remained 
relatively constant as a share of GDP. With strong economic growth 
came a commensurate increase in consumption. Investment increased 
dramatically, partly because of housing expenditure, and mainly 
funded through money flowing in on current account. The flip-side to 
this money inflow was that Iceland’s trade deficit deteriorated as it 
continued borrowing from abroad. By 2006, 17 percent of GDP came 
from foreign lending on current account. 
The primary malinvestment during the boom was the expansion 
of the aluminum smelting industry (Bagus and Howden 2011: 54-55). 
Aluminum smelting is a time-consuming process which is dependent 
in large part on low interest rates and high aluminum prices. Both 
were fostered during the boom as the CBI allowed for cheap 
borrowing while the global expansion of liquidity promoted high 
commodities prices. In 2003 plans were unveiled to build new 
hydroelectric and geothermal electrical plants to power the growing 
smelting business. Total investment amounted to almost $4 billion, 
roughly 35 percent of Icelandic GDP (Thorvaldsson 2009: 150).  
Investments in long-duration projects like these electrical plants 
are not necessarily a negative for the economy. It is instead a question 
of how long Icelanders were willing to wait before the fruits of these 
investments paid off. The low interest rate environment made the 
financial outlook on the projects appear positive, though consumers 
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with their new shortsightedness were not willing to curtail 
consumption for a lengthened period to provide the necessary 
savings; there grew a disconnect between savings and investment.  
As investments became ever more dependent on debt financing, a 
precarious situation was built whereby a lack of access to funding 
would destabilize all investments. Investment increased as a portion 
of GDP by more than 10 percentage points during the boom, though 
this would not have been a negative development had Icelanders 
increased their savings to fund it. As it turned out, the low interest 
rate environment continually discouraged savings throughout the 
decade, and by 2006 this rate turned negative (table 8). A nation of 
thrifty savers had been turned into a nation of debtors in less than a 
decade. Even if global liquidity did not evaporate in 2008 with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, Icelandic investments would have 
remained solvent only until the next slowdown in credit growth. 
Overconsumption and malinvestments can both be rectified in 
reasonably short order by shifting preferences and resources to a 
more sustainable array.  Long-term investments can be liquidated and 
their newly freed resources reallocated to more sustainable uses. The 
financial shift that resulted in the growth of the banking sector was 
more damaging, both in terms of the magnitude of the shift and the 
resources necessary to return it to sustainability. 
Construction employment averaged 6.6 percent annual growth 
from 2000-08, while the finance and real estate sectors each grew by 4 
and 3 percent per year (figure 3).  Over the same period, the more 
traditional income-generating sectors in the economy dwindled. The 
fishing industry, long a mainstay of Icelandic employment, lost almost 
5 percent of its workers each year as they were attracted to the new 
economic miracle in Reykjavík.  
The financial sector became so large that the best talent was 
poached from other areas of the economy. Young Icelanders turned 
away from learning about the traditional employment paths, such as 
fishing, and registered en masse in both domestic and foreign 
Universities to prepare themselves for a brighter future in finance. 
  
      
T
ab
le
 6
:  
D
ep
os
it 
ba
nk
 a
ss
et
s 
to
 G
D
P 
(P
er
ce
nt
) 
So
ur
ce
: F
ed
er
al
 R
es
er
ve
 B
an
k 
of
 S
t. 
Lo
ui
s, 
se
ri
es
 D
D
D
I0
2I
SA
15
6N
W
D
B
, D
D
D
I0
2U
SA
15
6N
W
D
B
 (
ac
ce
ss
ed
 5
 S
ep
t. 
20
13
).
 
 
 
  
´0
0 
´0
1 
´0
2 
´0
3 
´0
4 
´0
5 
´0
6 
´0
7 
´0
8 
´0
9 
´1
0 
´1
1 
Ic
el
an
d 
83
.2
 
94
.5
 
10
1.
7 
11
7.
7 
14
1.
9 
19
8 
27
0.
2 
27
5.
4 
18
9.
3 
13
1.
5 
12
8.
4 
11
7.
3 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
55
.4
 
57
.3
 
57
.6
 
57
.8
 
58
.4
 
59
.9
 
62
.3
 
64
.9
 
70
.7
 
70
.5
 
62
.5
 
63
.7
 
 T
ab
le
 7
:  
C
re
di
t e
xp
an
si
on
 in
 I
ce
la
nd
 a
nd
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
So
ur
ce
: S
t. 
Lo
ui
s F
ed
er
al
 R
es
er
ve
 E
co
no
m
ic
 D
at
a,
 se
ri
es
 D
D
SI
04
IS
A
15
6N
W
D
B
, D
D
SI
04
U
SA
15
6N
W
D
B
, M
A
B
M
M
20
1I
SA
18
9N
, 
M
2N
S 
(a
cc
es
se
d 
5 
Se
pt
. 2
01
3)
.  
 
  
B
an
k 
cr
ed
it 
to
 d
ep
os
its
 
(I
ce
la
nd
, p
er
ce
nt
) 
B
an
k 
cr
ed
it 
to
 d
ep
os
its
 
(U
.S
., 
pe
rc
en
t)
 
M
2 
gr
ow
th
 r
at
e 
(I
ce
la
nd
, p
er
ce
nt
) 
M
2 
gr
ow
th
 r
at
e 
(U
.S
., 
pe
rc
en
t)
 
20
00
 
22
8.
0 
77
.5
 
-3
.7
 
6.
1 
20
01
 
23
0.
5 
76
.3
 
11
.0
 
8.
6 
20
02
 
22
2.
4 
75
.8
 
9.
3 
7.
4 
20
03
 
23
1.
6 
78
.0
 
18
.4
 
7.
0 
20
04
 
28
4.
6 
81
.6
 
28
.0
 
4.
8 
20
05
 
36
4.
7 
83
.2
 
25
.6
 
4.
3 
20
06
 
33
2.
8 
82
.9
 
19
.4
 
5.
2 
20
07
 
28
4.
1 
80
.2
 
78
.6
 
6.
2 
20
08
 
12
0.
3 
76
.0
 
67
.0
 
6.
8 
20
09
 
10
9.
0 
71
.3
 
-6
.6
 
8.
0 
20
10
 
12
0.
3 
73
.9
 
-8
.5
 
2.
5 
20
11
 
10
4.
6 
69
.6
 
7.
8 
7.
3 
20
12
 
n.
a.
 
n.
a.
 
-9
.4
 
8.
5 
    Ta
bl
e 
8:
  
Ic
el
an
di
c 
sa
vi
ng
 a
nd
 b
or
ro
w
in
g 
(p
er
ce
nt
 o
f G
D
P)
 
So
ur
ce
: S
ta
tis
tic
s I
ce
la
nd
, n
at
io
na
l a
cc
ou
nt
s d
at
a 
(a
cc
es
se
d 
7 
Se
pt
. 2
01
3)
 
   
00
 
01
 
02
 
03
 
04
 
05
 
06
 
07
 
08
 
09
 
10
 
11
 
12
 
Sa
vi
ng
 r
at
e 
0.
02
 
0.
06
 
0.
09
 
0.
03
 
0.
03
 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
00
 
-0
.2
3 
-0
.2
3 
-0
.1
8 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.0
8 
N
et
 le
nd
in
g/
 
bo
rr
ow
in
g 
 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
5 
0.
02
 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.1
9 
-0
.3
0 
-0
.2
0 
-0
.3
9 
-0
.1
8 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
8 
!
Fi
gu
re
 3
: 
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
y 
ec
on
om
ic
 a
ct
iv
ity
 
So
ur
ce
: S
ta
tis
tic
s I
ce
la
nd
, l
ab
ou
r 
m
ar
ke
t d
at
ab
as
e 
(a
cc
es
se
d 
9 
Se
pt
. 2
01
3)
 
0!2,000!4,000!6,000!8,000!10,000
!
12,000
!
14,000
!
16,000
!
18,000
!
20,000
! 20
00!
2001!
2002!
2003!
2004!
2005!
2006!
2007!
2008!
Fishing
!
Constr
uction!
Financ
ial!inte
rmedia
tion!
Retail!e
state!a
nd!bus
iness!a
ctivitie
s!
 David Howden 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 
418 
 “Everyone was learning Black-Scholes”6 (the option-pricing model), 
says Ragnar Arnason, a professor of fishing economics at the 
University of Iceland, who watched students flee the economics of 
fishing for the economics of money. “The schools of engineering and 
math were offering courses on financial engineering. We had 
hundreds and hundreds of people studying finance.” (as quoted in 
Michael Lewis 2009) 
Universities began changing their course offerings to focus on the 
new demands this shift created. New graduates found lucrative 
opportunities, some even before finishing their degrees. “An 
apocryphal story went that the car park at the university was so full of 
student cars that the professors had difficulties finding places to park 
their bicycles” (Thorvaldsson 2009, p. 147). Young men on the streets 
of Reykjavik could recite the Black-Scholes formula as well as the 
day’s salmon prices.  
One negative consequence of the employment shift into finance 
was the dearth of talent in the real sector. Not only were the best and 
brightest attracted to the financial sector, but as the number of 
workers in the real economy shrank, so too did the country’s 
productive capacity. This productivity shock is important, as it helps 
to explain Iceland’s growing reliance on imported goods and the 
related foreign indebtedness.7  
The reallocation of labor from the real to financial sectors of the 
economy could not proceed unabated. At some point the current 
account deficit that the loss of export capacity created would result in 
bills that needed to be paid. Overconsumption had left the country 
with little savings (indeed, the rate was negative by 2006), and income 
                                 
6 “Black-Scholes” refers here to a complex pricing formula for financial 
“options”. An option allows one to have the opportunity to buy or sell another 
financial asset (e.g., a stock) in the future at a pre-determined price. 
7 This shift is also time-consuming to reverse. Time is required to retrain to 
learn the tools necessary to return the economy to sustainability. As one fisherman 
lamented, “I think it is easier to take someone in the fishing industry and teach 
him about currency trading than to take someone from the banking industry and 
teach them how to fish” (Lewis 2009).  
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growth was reliant on unsustainable patterns of investment. By 
financing its longer-dated investments by continually rolling over 
short-term financing, the Icelandic economy was able to survive but 
was fully dependent on the continual availability of cheap short-term 
credit (Bagus and Howden 2011: chap. 2).  
The liquidity shock created by Lehman Brothers may have proved 
to be one cause of Iceland’s collapse, though it was not the only one 
capable of doing so. Indeed, even in the absence of a “sudden stop” 
type end to liquidity, the Icelandic economy would still have 
floundered (although perhaps at a slower pace). The reason is that 
the debt buildups throughout the 2000s were not consistent with 
sustainable growth necessary to service these debts into the future. 
The disjointing of savings from investment gave rise to an 
unsustainable situation that could only persist in the era of the 
artificially low interest rates that begot it. Whether rates increased 
from an exogenous liquidity shock or endogenously by rising risk 
premia, or decreased by the continued lack of savings, the end result 
would have been the same: the failure of investments built upon a 
base of underpriced credit as risk-adjusted borrowing costs increased. 
Conclusion 
As we assess the causes of Iceland’s collapse, there are four 
important lessons. 
First, blanket investment guarantees sow the seeds of unintended 
consequences, some of which may not materialize until years into the 
future. The CBI promoted risk-taking while serving explicitly as a 
lender of last resort, and the FME’s deposit insurance plan skewed 
depositors to entrust more funds to the banking sector than would 
otherwise be the case. International organizations such as the IMF 
worsened matters by removing sovereign default risk through their 
implicit pledges to intervene during times of crisis. The ambiguity of 
cross-border guarantees, such as how deposit insurance would work 
for Icelandic subsidiaries in Europe, complicated matters.  
Second, central bank controlled interest rates impose an 
important price on the market which is potentially inconsistent with 
underlying savings and investment preferences. By setting this price 
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too low, the CBI induced a general underpricing of risk, demotivated 
consumers from saving and promoted malinvestments. The current 
recession will not end until the economy has a foundation of savings 
and has investment that is properly based on an interest rate reflective 
of underlying preferences.  
Third, certain banking laws engender large amounts of credit 
creation which may fuel an unsustainable boom. In particular, the 
ability of the private banking system to use fractional reserves created 
a period of rapid credit growth. The access to and economization of 
funding through their reserves allowed banks to grow to sizes 
otherwise not possible. This factor in part explains how Icelandic 
banks could grow to such a seemingly oversized magnitude relative to 
the small economy.  
Finally, credit-based booms such as Iceland’s are not necessarily 
brought to an end because of liquidity shocks. They sow the seeds of 
their own destruction by breeding unsustainable consumption, 
production and financing plans. Increasingly over the 2000s, Icelandic 
businesses invested in projects that were only made possible through 
low interest rates. Since rates could not remain at their historic lows 
forever, eventually these investments would fail as rates rose. Lacking 
an exogenous shock such as Lehman Brothers, the increase in interest 
rates would most likely have occurred when investors reset their risk 
perceptions of the Icelandic economy higher, as was already the case 
briefly during the Geyser crisis of 2006.  
Most importantly, while Iceland is illustrative of a small country 
falling prey to these follies, it is by no means the only country to do so. 
Similar factors exist in almost every developed economy. The 
Economist (2013) recently asked “Where’s the next Lehman?” While 
such a question may be relevant, it ignores the more pressing fact. 
The next crisis may be precipitated not by a sudden stop of credit, but 
by a slowdown in credit availability coupled with declining growth 
rates that expose the previously unsustainable investments for what 
they are.  
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